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Articles 
Data Portability and Data Control: Lessons for an Emerging 
Concept in EU Law* 
 
By Inge Graef, ** Martin Husovec,*** & Nadezhda Purtova**** 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
The right to data portability (RtDP) introduced by Article 20 of the General Data Protection 
Regulation (GDPR) forms a regulatory innovation within EU law. The RtDP provides data 
subjects with the possibility to transfer personal data among data controllers, but has an 
impact beyond data protection. In particular, the RtDP facilitates the reuse of personal 
data that private companies hold by establishing a general-purpose control mechanism of 
horizontal application. Article 20 of the GDPR is agnostic about the type of use that follows 
from the ported data and its further diffusion. We argue that the RtDP does not fit well 
with the fundamental rights nature of data protection law, and should instead be seen as a 
new regulatory tool in EU law that aims to stimulate competition and innovation in data-
driven markets.  
 
What remains unclear is the extent to which the RtDP will be limited in its aspirations 
where intellectual property rights of current data holders—such as copyright, trade secrets 
and sui generis database rights—cause the regimes to clash. In such cases, a reconciliation 
of the interests might particularly confine the follow-on use of ported data again to specific 
set of socially justifiable purposes, possibly with schemes of fair remuneration. Despite 
these uncertainties, the RtDP is already being replicated in other fields, namely consumer 
protection law and the regulation of non-personal data. Competition law can also facilitate 
                                            
* The research presented in this article has been conducted in the framework of a research project studying the 
impact of data portability on individuals, competition and innovation that received funding from Tilburg Law 
School and Signify. The authors would like to thank Kees Stuurman and Francisco Costa-Cabral for their valuable 
comments. Legislative developments up to November 9, 2018 have been taken into account. 
** Assistant professor at Tilburg University, affiliated to the Tilburg Institute for Law, Technology, and Society 
(TILT) and the Tilburg Law and Economics Center (TILEC). 
*** Assistant professor at Tilburg University, affiliated to the Tilburg Institute for Law, Technology, and Society 
(TILT) and the Tilburg Law and Economics Center (TILEC); affiliated scholar at Stanford University's Center for 
Internet and Society (CIS). 
**** Associate professor at Tilburg University, affiliated to the Tilburg Institute for Law, Technology, and Society 
(TILT). 
1360 G e r m a n  L a w  J o u r n a l   Vol. 19 No. 06 
portability of data, but only for purpose-specific goals with the aim of addressing 
anticompetitive behavior.  
 
We conclude that to the extent that other regimes will try to replicate the RtDP, they 
should closely consider the nature of the resulting control and its breadth and impact on 
incentives to innovate. In any case, the creation of data portability regimes should not 
become an end in itself. With an increasing number of instruments, orchestrating the 
consistency of legal regimes within the Digital Single Market and their mutual interplay 
should become an equally important concern. 
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A. Introduction  
 
As a part of its Digital Single Market Strategy, the European Commission committed to 
developing a European data economy.1 Data has been acknowledged as an essential 
resource for economic growth, and it is estimated that by 2020 the size of the EU data 
economy may increase to €739 billion—or 4% of the overall EU GDP.2 Against this 
background, the regulation of the allocation of and extent of control over data—by way of 
exclusive rights or possibilities of access—becomes increasingly important. Put differently, 
the shape and direction of data flows—as well as varieties of data-enabled business 
models and the ways of drawing value from data—will depend on multiple factors. These 
include: who gets access to data and under what circumstances; who is precluded from 
access; who can move or keep their data assets to itself; and who is obliged to share data 
with others. Data portability, namely “the ability to move, copy or transfer” data,3 is one of 
the instruments of such control.  
 
A significant share of the data circulating in the digital economy is the data relating to 
identified or identifiable natural persons, which constitutes “personal data” in the sense of 
EU data protection law. Against this background, the new GDPR4 introduces a regulatory 
innovation: RtDP in relation to personal data. Under Article 20 of the GDPR, an individual 
to whom the data relates—a data subject5—has a right to receive a copy of personal data 
pertaining to him or her—in a structured, commonly used, and machine-readable format—
                                            
1 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the Economic and Social 
Committee and the Committee of the Regions on a Digital Single Market Strategy for Europe 14, COM (2015) 192 
final (May 6, 2015). 
2 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and 
Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on Building a European Data Economy, COM (2017) 9 final 
(Jan. 10, 2017). 
3 Commission Staff Working Document on the Free Flow of Data and Emerging Issues of the European Data 
Economy, Accompanying the Document Communication Building a European Data Economy 46, SWD (2017) 2 
final (Jan. 10, 2017).  
4 Regulation 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of April 27, 2016 on the Protection of 
Natural Persons with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of such Data, and 
Repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation), 2016 O.J. (L 119) (EU) [hereinafter GDPR]. 
5 See id. art. 4(1) (defining a data subject as “an identified or identifiable natural person” and specifying that  
an identifiable person is one who can be identified, directly or 
indirectly, in particular by reference to an identifier such as a name, 
an identification number, location data, online identifier or to one or 
more factors specific to the physical, physiological, genetic, mental, 
economic, cultural or social identity of that natural person . . . .)  
In this article, the terms “data subject,” “individual,” “consumer,” and “user” will be used interchangeably. 
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and to transmit this data to, in the data protection parlance, another “controller”—namely 
any person or legal entity who determines the purposes and means of data processing.6  
 
To illustrate, users of the online music streaming service A, in theory, should be able to 
demand exportation of their personal data such as music preferences, and import it into 
music streaming service B. The RtDP will inevitably affect the landscape of control over 
personal data, both in relations between the users of digital services and the service 
providers and in relations between competitors on the market of digital services. Since the 
GDPR and the new RtDP have become effective on May 25, 2018,7 this article provides a 
much-needed mapping and study of anticipated issues in the implementation of the new 
right.  
 
The objective of this article is two-fold. On the one hand, the article aims to examine the 
allocation, nature, and extent of control over personal data that will result from the RtDP 
as introduced in the GDPR. On the other hand, the article extrapolates these findings 
beyond Article 20 of the GDPR and pays attention to the rise of data portability as an 
emerging concept in regimes of EU law other than data protection. As such, rather than 
providing concrete answers as to the desired scope of data portability, the article gives an 
overview of the current state of data portability in EU law and raises issues that need to be 
considered in the future development of the concept.  
 
The article proceeds in the following steps. Part B gives a short overview of the legislative 
history of the RtDP under Article 20 of the GDPR. Part C examines from a data protection 
perspective the nature and extent of individual control conferred by Article 20 of the 
GDPR, which introduces the RtDP and sets out its scope and limitations. Part D then 
continues the this analysis by exploring the RtDP’s interface with intellectual property 
(“IP”) and possible market outcomes. IP might in some situations re-define the aspirations 
of the RtDP as a general-purpose regime. In addition, the competitive impact of the RtDP is 
vital to understand its side consequences on markets beyond the individual as the primary 
beneficiary under the GDPR. Part E approaches data portability from a broader perspective 
by exploring the extent to which data portability can be facilitated on the basis of other 
regimes next to Article 20 of the GDPR, namely competition and consumer protection law. 
Based on this analysis, Part F concludes by offering lessons which should inform any future 
general-purpose regimes for data portability like the GDPR.  
 
The article puts forward that the RtDP of the GDPR is a first attempt to establish a 
general-purpose control mechanism of horizontal application that will mainly facilitate the 
sharing and reuse of data. While a sector-specific form of portability applies in some 
                                            
6 Id. art. 4(7). 
7 Id. art. 99. 
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industries—for instance, in telecom and banking8—the GDPR introduces for the first time a 
horizontal regime that will apply across sectors to the economy as a whole. Unlike current 
initiatives in consumer protection law, RtDP does not confer ownership-like control over 
ported data, but rather facilitates control for the purposes of reuse. We submit that it also 
does not unequivocally belong within the scope of the fundamental right to data 
protection but should rather be regarded as a tool to stimulate competition and 
innovation. Despite the regulatory silence, IP law will be relevant both by creating 
limitations on the RtDP of data subjects under the GDPR and by safeguarding control 
claims of businesses regarding their interests over datasets against competitors. When IP 
rights of current data holders—such as their copyright, trade secrets, and sui generis 
database rights—cause the two regimes to clash, a reconciliation of the different interests 
might limit the free follow-on use of ported data under the RtDP again to a purpose-
specific context. This generalist approach with ex-post correction through balancing 
contrasts with competition law, which may also impose limitations as to how firms use and 
control data to compete. Unlike the GDPR—which provides data subjects with an RtDP of a 
general scope which can be invoked against any data controller irrespective of the purpose 
for which portability is sought—competition law can be used only to facilitate data 
portability on a case-by-case basis for specific goals remedying identified and proved 
competition concerns. When we look beyond these two regimes, we can observe an 
increasing number of initiatives that seem to be replicating the GDPR’s generalist design. 
Based on the analysis of Article 20 of the GDPR, we offer lessons for data portability as an 
emerging regulatory innovation spreading to different fields of EU law. 
 
B. Legislative History of the Right to Data Portability 
 
To adequately interpret the RtDP under EU data protection law, it is worthwhile to 
consider its evolution in legislative history from origin to final adoption. The RtDP in data 
protection law was introduced by the European Commission in January 2012 in the 
proposal for a GDPR.9 The new right was one of the instruments by which the Commission 
                                            
8 See Directive 2002/22/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of March 7, 2002 on Universal Service 
and the Rights of Users Relating to Electronic Communications Networks and Services (Universal Service 
Directive), 2002 O.J. (L 108) 51, as amended by Directive 2009/136/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of November 25, 2009, 2009 O.J. (L 337) 11 (stating that under Art. 30 of the Universal Service Directive, 
porting of telephone numbers and their subsequent activation has to take place against a cost-oriented price and 
within the shortest possible time which is interpreted as maximum one working day); see also Directive 
2015/2366 of the European Parliament and of the Council of November 25, 2015 on Payment Services in the 
Internal Market, 2015 O.J.( L 337) 35 (EU) (stating that under Art. 66 and 67 of the Payment Services Directive 2 to 
be implemented in national law by January 13, 2018, third party providers are able to access a customer’s 
payment account information on the customer’s request in order to provide payment initiation or account 
information services).  
9 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the Protection of Individuals with 
Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of such Data, COM (2012) 11 final (Jan. 25, 
2012). 
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sought to restore trust in online services. By enabling data subjects to transfer personal 
data among data controllers, the Commission aimed to ensure individual control over 
personal data held by service providers.10 
 
The subsequent review of the Commission’s proposal in the European Parliament led to 
the adoption of numerous amendments contained in the legislative resolution of March 
2014.11 As a result of some of these amendments, the RtDP was merged with the right of 
access. Even though the principles underlying the original RtDP that the Commission 
proposed remained unchanged in the amended proposal, the European Parliament 
expressed the view that the RtDP should be seen as a mere extension of the right of access 
rather than a right of its own. Ultimately, in the final version of the GDPR as adopted by 
the European Parliament and the Council in April 2016, the RtDP was again included in a 
separate article.12  
 
Before its final adoption, the RtDP had to overcome a critical review by the Council, where 
several member states expressed doubts as to whether it should be retained in the GDPR. 
A number of member states pointed to the risks of data portability for the competitive 
positions of companies and raised issues about the relationship between commercial 
confidentiality and the IP of data controllers. Some member states even considered data 
portability not to be within the scope of data protection, but rather in consumer or 
competition law.13 Nonetheless, as the new right aimed to increase the control of data 
subjects over their personal data and to ensure the free flow of personal data between 
member states, it was eventually considered to fall within the ambit of an EU data 
protection instrument. In the end, the RtDP survived the negotiations in the Council and 
was included as Article 20 of the GDPR. A clause in Article 20(4), stating that the RtDP 
“shall not adversely affect the rights and freedoms of others,” was included to remedy 
possible harmful effects on the interests of third parties. 
 
                                            
10 Commission Staff Working Paper Impact Assessment Accompanying the Document Regulation of the European 
Parliament and of the Council on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and 
on the Free Movement of such Data (General Data Protection Regulation) and the Directive of the European 
Parliament and of the Council on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data by 
Competent Authorities for the Purposes of Prevention, Investigation, Detection or Prosecution of Criminal Offences 
or the Execution of Criminal Penalties, and the Free Movement of such Data, at 43, SEC (2012) 72 final [hereinafter 
Impact Assessment]. 
11 Resolution on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free 
Movement of Such Data (General Data Protection Regulation), EUR. PARL. DOC. P7_TA(2014)0212 (2014) 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=TA&language=EN&reference=P7-TA-2014-0212.    
12 See GDPR, supra note 4, art. 20. 
13 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the Protection of Individuals with 
Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data (General Data Protection 
Regulation), COD (2014) 10614/14 (June 6, 2014) 3 n.1. 
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As the final wording of the RtDP leaves open quite a number of issues regarding its scope 
and implementation, the Article 29 Working Party (WP29)14 published draft guidelines in 
December 2016, discussing the new right and clarifying the conditions under which it is 
applicable.15 After a public consultation—in which stakeholders were given the opportunity 
to comment on these draft guidelines—WP29 issued its final guidelines on April 5, 2017.16 
The guidance aimed to prepare controllers who have had to start applying the RtDP and 
the GDPR as a whole as from May 25, 2018.17 
 
While the main policy objective of the Commission behind the introduction of the RtDP 
was to ensure that individuals are in control of their personal data and trust the digital 
environment, it is clear that the new right may also reduce lock-in by enabling users to 
switch easily between services. As a result, the RtDP could foster competition between 
controllers as a side-effect and thereby encourage the development of new data-related 
services. As such, the new right interacts with other legal fields such as competition and IP 
law. As already hinted above, interactions with IP law may put restrictions on the extent to 
which data subjects may effectively invoke their RtDP. Considering the hybrid nature of the 
RtDP, one can raise the questions of how it fits with the fundamental right to data 
protection and what the nature of control is that it aims to ensure.  
 
C. The Right to Data Portability and Individual Control 
 
The RtDP is indeed strongly connected to the rhetoric of individual control that dominated 
the data protection reform efforts. According to Recital 68 of the final version of the GDPR, 
the RtDP shall “further strengthen [data subjects’] control” over their personal data. In its 
April 2017 guidelines specifying the scope of the new right and the conditions of its 
application, WP29 similarly notes that “[t]he primary aim of data portability is enhancing 
individual’s control over their personal data and making sure they play an active role in the 
data ecosystem.”18 This Section will explore how data portability delivers on this promise.  
  
                                            
14 WP29 is composed of the following parties: a representative from the National Data Protection Authority of 
each EU Member State; a representative of the European Data Protection Supervisor (the independent 
supervisory authority that is responsible for ensuring that all EU institutions and bodies respect people’s right to 
personal data protection and privacy when processing their personal data); and a representative of the European 
Commission. 
15 Art. 29 Data Protection Working Party, Guidelines on the Right to Data Portability, 16/EN WP 242 (Dec. 13, 
2016). 
16 Art. 29 Data Protection Working Party, Guidelines on the Right to Data Portability, 16/EN WP 242 rev.01 (Apr. 5, 
2017) [hereinafter WP29]. 
17 See, e.g., GDPR, supra note 4, art. 99(2).  
18 WP29, supra note 16, at 4 n.1 (emphasis added). 
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I. Nature of Control: Fundamental Rights, Data Ownership, and Sharing 
What is the nature of control that data portability ensures? The forthcoming analysis will 
examine this from three–not mutually excluding–angles: (1) how data portability relates to 
the fundamental right to data protection and the related rhetoric of control; (2) control as 
data ownership; and (3) control to enable data sharing. It is argued that the kind of control 
data portability grants does not unequivocally belong within the scope of the fundamental 
right to data protection. At the same time, data portability does not create ownership-like 
control over personal data; its nature can instead be best defined by reference to the data 
sharing and reuse that it facilitates. 
 
1. Data Portability and the Fundamental Right to Data Protection 
 
Data portability is often connected to control over personal data as part of the 
fundamental right to data protection under Article 8 of the EU Charter of Fundamental 
Rights [hereinafter the Charter]. This connection is based on the legislative history of the 
GDPR. According to the Commission, one of the three general objectives of the reform was 
“[t]o increase the effectiveness of the fundamental right to data protection,” which 
implied, among others, “that individuals are in control of their personal data and trust the 
digital environment.”19 The Commission considered data portability as instrumental to 
ensuring such control and the effectiveness of the fundamental right of Article 8 of the 
Charter.20 Therefore, data portability appears to be regarded by the Commission as part of 
the fundamental right to data protection. This interpretation is further supported by the 
non-binding explanation of the EU Network of Independent Experts on Fundamental 
Rights.21 
 
Yet, Article 8 of the Charter does not explicitly mention data portability or control, while it 
does explicitly contain parallels with other provisions of the GDPR. The general clause of 
Article 8(1) envisages simply that “[e]veryone has the right to the protection of personal 
data.” The qualifying provisions in Article 8(2) further specify that “[s]uch data must be 
processed fairly for specified purposes”22 and on the basis of the consent or another 
legitimate ground laid down by law;23 that everyone has the right of access to data24 and 
                                            
19 Impact Assessment, supra note 10, at 62. 
20 Impact Assessment, supra note 10.  
21 See EU Network of Independent Experts on Fundamental Rights Commentary of the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights of the European Union, at 95 (June 2006), http://ec.europa.eu/justice/fundamental-
rights/document/index_en.htm (stating, namely, that secondary legislation is adopted to give effect to the 
fundamental right to data protection, and that “the protection of personal data shall be exercised in accordance 
with the conditions and limits defined by the measures adopted to give effect to it.”). 
22 See GDPR, supra note 4, art. 5(1) (a), (b) (featuring a parallel structure). 
23 See id. at art. 6, 9.  
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the right to rectification.25 Finally, Article 8(3) states that “[c]ompliance with these rules 
shall be subject to control by an independent authority.”26  
 
Neither can the RtDP be regarded as an extension of the right of access explicitly 
mentioned as protected under Article 8(2) of the Charter.27 The scope of the RtDP goes 
beyond access in some aspects—for instance in what is provided to the data subject and in 
what format—and in others falls short—for instance in the limited range of situations in 
which it is applicable. While the right of access grants only a right to receive a confirmation 
of data processing and a copy of data undergoing processing “in a commonly used 
electronic form,”28 data portability enables the data subject to receive a copy for own use 
and to transmit the data to another controller in a “structured, commonly used and 
machine-readable” format,29 making data portability especially suitable for the digital 
context. At the same time, compared to the right of access which is of general application, 
the broader data portability right is applicable only in a reduced number of situations. It 
can be invoked only regarding the data “provided” by the data subject to the controller,30 
and only when processing is automated31 and based on consent32 or on a contract.33 
 
These observations raise doubt about whether data portability falls within the scope of 
Article 8 of the Charter, as well as about the fundamental rights nature of the kind of 
control the new RtDP is giving.34 The relationship between data portability and Article 8 of 
the Charter fits within a larger discussion of the relationship between the Data Protection 
Directive and the GDPR, on the one hand, and Article 8 of the Charter, on the other hand.  
                                                                                                                
24 See id.at art. 15. 
25 See id. at art. 19.  
26 See generally id. at art. 51. 
27 See Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, 2012/C 326/02, art. 8(2), 2012 O.J. (C 326) 391 
(“Everyone has the right of access to data which has been collected concerning him or her, and the right to have it 
rectified.”). 
28 See GDPR, supra note 4, art 15(1), (3).  
29 See id. at art 20(1). 
30 See discussion infra Section C.II. on the notion of provided data. 
31 See GDPR, supra note 4, art. 20(1)(b). 
32 See id. at art. 6(1)(a), 9(2)(a). 
33 See id. at art. 6(1)(b). 
34 But see Orla Lynskey, Aligning Data Protection Rights with Competition Law Remedies? The GDPR Right to Data 
Portability, 42(6) EUR. L. REV. 793, 809–10 (2017) (claiming that the right to data portability “sits coherently within 
the data protection regime” because it promotes individual control over personal data by enhancing 
informational self-determination as “a central objective of the EU data protection regime.”). 
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2. Data Portability and Data Ownership 
 
A number of scholars suggest that data portability is closely akin to the property-rights 
approach to data protection or data ownership.35 These authors, however, seem to focus 
on what Rubinstein calls “property-related actions like trading, exchanging, or selling 
data,”36 rather than the defining element of property rights—namely the right to exclude. 
This meaning of the concept “property” is not attached to any one jurisdiction, but derives 
from studies in comparative European property law. Property thus is any interest in an 
object, tangible or intangible, that is directed against the entire world (has a so-called erga 
omnes effect).37 Alienability, or the ability to trade, is therefore not a necessary defining 
characteristic of property.38 The RtDP as a property right would enable the data subject to 
take his or her data and leave a digital platform or service. Article 20 of the GDPR, 
however, alone or in combination with the right to erasure, does not create such a right to 
exclude.  
 
Data portability and erasure are two independent rights under the GDPR; when the RtDP is 
invoked, it does not automatically trigger a request for erasure.39 While the two requests 
can be aligned and filed at the same time—for instance in case the data subject withdraws 
its consent for the processing—the alignment is not perfect. This is due to the limited 
scope of application of the right to erasure and a wide range of situations following from 
Article 17(1) and (3) GDPR, where the request for erasure may be left unsatisfied. For 
instance, a data subject cannot obtain erasure of personal data by withdrawing consent 
when the controller can justify processing on another ground under Article 6 GDPR—
namely contract or legitimate interest of the controller. 
 
  
                                            
35 See, e.g., Ira Rubinstein, Big Data: The End of Privacy or a New Beginning?, 3 INT’L DATA PRIVACY L., 74–87 (2013); 
see also Peter Swire & Yianni Lagos, Why the Right to Data Portability Likely Reduces Consumer Welfare: Antitrust 
and Privacy Critique, 72 MD. L. REV. 335, 373 (2013); Paul De Hert et al., The Right to Data Portability in the GDPR: 
Towards User-Centric Interoperability of Digital Services, 34 COMPUT. L. & SEC. REV. 193, 201 (2018). 
36 Rubinstein, supra note 35, at 84. 
37 NADEZHDA PURTOVA, PROPERTY RIGHTS IN PERSONAL DATA: A EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVE 57 (2011). 
38 Id. at 86–88; but see Elinor Ostrom & Charlotte Hess, Private and Common Property Rights, in 5 PROP. L. & ECON. 
53, 59 (Boudewijn Bouckaert ed., 2010) (“Property-rights systems that do not contain the right of alienation are 
considered to be ill-defined.”). 
39 WP29, supra note 16, at 7. 
2018 Data Portability and Data Control 1369 
             
3. Portability for Data Sharing and Reuse 
 
What seems to characterize the function of data portability more accurately is granting 
control of the kind that enables free flow of data among controllers, namely data sharing 
and reuse. Similarly, Drexl argues that the right to data portability should be considered as 
a tool of access enabling individuals to switch where access to data is crucial for 
competition.40 The RtDP consists of two elements: (1) the right to obtain a copy of data, 
and (2) the right to transmit data to another controller, also directly. In the latter regard, 
Article 20(2) GDPR states that “the data subject shall have the right to have the personal 
data transmitted directly from one controller to another, where technically feasible.” 
Recalling the Guidelines on data portability of WP29, “[t]he primary aim of data portability 
is enhancing individual’s control . . . and making sure they play an active role in the 
data ecosystem.”41 As WP29 interprets it, in addition to preventing service lock-ins, the 
RtDP “[i]n essence . . . is expected to foster opportunities for innovation and sharing of 
personal data between data controller . . . under the data subject’s control.”42 
 
The emphasis on data sharing and reuse is reinforced by the requirement for the format of 
transmitted data. In accordance with Article 20(1) GDPR, it has to be “structured, 
commonly used and machine-readable,” aiming to produce interoperable systems.43 WP29 
suggests the use of Application Programming Interfaces (“APIs”) to facilitate automated 
data portability.44 The automated RtDP will enable business models either assisting 
individuals with their data management or capitalizing on reuse of personal data collected 
by others. WP29 explains that the use of APIs “would enable individuals to make requests 
for their personal data via their own or third-party software or grant permission for others 
to so do on their behalf (including another data controller) . . . .”45 
 
Preventing lock-ins and promoting innovation by reuse may be broadly supported 
purposes of regulation, and the ability of data subjects to share and reuse their data may 
constitute a form of control over data. Such power is meant to be general-purpose control 
in the sense that the law does not confine the exercise of the control with some types of 
socially beneficial activity or social goals. In this sense, it is completely “purpose agnostic.” 
Yet one can doubt: first, if this kind of control that aims at more intensive data (re)use 
                                            
40 Josef Drexl, Designing Competitive Markets for Industrial Data — Between Propertisation and Access, 8 JIPITEC 
257, 286, para. 155 (2017). 
41 WP29, supra note 16, at 4 n.1 (emphasis added). 
42 Id. at 5. 
43 Id. at 4, 14. 
44 Id. at 15.  
45 See generally WP29, supra note 16. 
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belongs with data protection and its roots in privacy; and second, like Koops asks, if data 
protection law is the right place to address all data-related problems.46  
 
II. Extent of Control: Processing Grounds and Data Types 
 
Having established that the nature of control data portability grants is limited to data 
sharing and reuse, this Section will demonstrate that the extent of such control is also 
limited: (1) in terms of the conditions of processing that allow data portability, and (2) in 
terms of the kinds of data that can be ported.  
 
1. Scope Limitations Concerning Processing Grounds 
 
It has already been noted that the impact of the RtDP will likely be limited because the 
right can be invoked only—following Article 20(1) GDPR—with regard to personal data 
processed based on consent47 or on a contract48.49 This caveat effectively excludes an 
obligation for the controller to provide a copy of the data processed under all other 
grounds, including legitimate interest.50 This raises the question whether controllers will be 
able to preclude data subjects from relying on the RtDP by invoking a legitimate interest as 
a ground for processing personal data instead of consent or a contract.  
 
Article 20(3) and Recital 68 GDPR explicitly exclude portability of data when processing is 
“necessary for the performance of a task carried out in the public interest or in the 
exercise of official authority vested in the controller.” The reason behind the latter caveat 
is unclear because data processed by public authorities has already been made available 
for reuse via open data initiatives harmonized by the PSI Directive.51 The PSI Directive 
created a clear obligation for member states to make all documents reusable in a machine-
readable format, albeit without prejudice to data protection law and subject to 
                                            
46 Bert-Jaap Koops, The Trouble with European Data Protection Law, 4 INT’L DATA PRIVACY L., 250–61 (2014). 
47 See GDPR, supra note 4, art. 6(1)(a), 9(2)(a) (specifying this point for special categories of data). 
48 See id. 
49 Colette Cuijpers et al., Data Protection Reform and the Internet: The Draft Data Protection Regulation, in 
RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON EU INTERNET LAW 543, 558 (Andrej Savin & Jan Tzarkowski eds., 2014). 
50 See GDPR, supra note 4, art. 6(1)(f). 
51 Directive 2003/98/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of November 17, 2003 on the Re-Use of 
Public Sector information 2003 O.J. (L 345) 90, last amended by Directive 2013/37/EU of the European Parliament 
and of the Council of June 26, 2013 2013 O.J. (L 175) 1 [hereinafter PSI Directive] (stating that the amendments 
are in effect from July 18, 2015). 
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exceptions.52 Both Article 20 of the GDPR and the arrangements of the PSI Directive are 
without prejudice to national regimes and their access to documents.53 Therefore, the 
purpose of preventing abuse of rights—namely the use of data portability to create a back-
door right of access to the documents of public authorities where such a right does not 
exist—does not work as a justification for the exclusion of personal data held by public 
authorities from the scope of the RtDP.  
 
Nevertheless, WP29 suggests making data portability arrangements as a matter of good 
practice when data portability is not mandatory under Article 20 of the GDPR, for instance 
when data is processed by public authorities or for legitimate interest.54 The 
recommendation concerning the processing for legitimate interest might be of a more 
persuasive authority, given that the availability of data portability tools needs to be taken 
into account when assessing if legitimate interest under Article 6(1)(f) of the GDPR is a 
suitable processing ground—for instance, when balancing interests of the controller with 
rights and interests of others.55 
 
2. Scope Limitations Concerning Data Types 
 
As the scope of the GDPR is limited to the processing of personal data, only personal 
data—namely information relating to a natural person who is identified or identifiable by 
means reasonably likely to be used—can be subject to a data portability request. Truly 
anonymous data is excluded. Given the progress in data analytics, the range of data that 
falls under the definition of personal data expands56—and so in principle should the range 
of situations where data portability can be invoked. At the same time—in line with Article 
11(1) of the GDPR—data controllers are not required to maintain data in an identifiable 
form solely to meet portability requests. When data is pseudonymous—namely the data 
can be attributed to a specific data subject only with additional information57—data 
controllers are not required to re-identify, unless the data subject “provides additional 
                                            
52 PSI Directive, supra note 51, at art. 4; but see id. at recital 8, 9 of the preamble (explaining that article 4 does 
not apply if access is, for instance, restricted or excluded under national access rules and due to third-party 
interests). 
53 See CJEU, Joined Cases C-141/12 and C- 372/12, YS et al. v. Minister of Immigration, Integration and Asylum, 
ECLI:EU:C:2014:2081, Judgement of July 17, 2014 (concerning the relationship between data protection rights and 
the right to access to documents). 
54 WP29, supra note 16, at 8 n.16. 
55 Id. (referring to the relevant pages of WP29, “Opinion 06/2014 on the notion of legitimate interests of the data 
controller under Article 7 of Directive 95/46/EC,” April 9, 2014, WP217).   
56 See, e.g., Nadezhda Purtova, The Law of Everything. Broad Concept of Personal Data and Future of EU Data 
Protection Law, 10 LAW, INNOVATION & TECH. 40–81 (2018) (discussing the broad notion of personal data). 
57 See GDPR, supra note 4, art. 4(5). 
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information enabling his or her identification,” as specified in Article 11(2) GDPR. Read 
together, Articles 20 and 11 GDPR may motivate controllers to opt for processing 
pseudonymised datasets to avoid the obligations of data portability when they are 
unwilling to share—for instance to preserve their unique datasets. At the same time, 
frequent use of Article 11(2) may lead to more frequent identification of data subjects. 
Though meant to facilitate data reuse, it would potentially reduce anonymity and 
pseudonymity in other contexts. 
 
While controllers may freely choose to facilitate portability of all data, the more impactful 
and debated scope limitation is that the enforceable right exists only for data the data 
subject “provided to the controller” under Article 20(1)’s first indent. The GDPR does not 
provide an explanation as to the meaning of “provided.” Hence, this provision can be 
construed in various ways.58  
 
(1) In the narrowest sense, “provided data” would mean data volunteered, or actively 
disclosed by the data subject—for instance by filling in a form or answering a 
questionnaire.  
 
(2) A broader interpretation would also include data that is “passively provided,” or 
observed, by use of equipment or service provided by the controller.  
 
(3) The broadest interpretation would include all data processed by the controller on the 
grounds of contract or consent. Such interpretation can be based on the idea that data 
processing on the grounds of contract to which the data subject has agreed and consent of 
the data subject imply that the data is provided by the data subject.  
 
WP29 chose a middle ground and interprets “provided data” as the “data actively and 
knowingly provided by the data subject” and “observed data provided by the data subject 
by virtue of the use of the service or the device.”59 The observed data includes a person’s 
search history, traffic and location data, other raw data—such as the heartbeat tracked by 
a wearable device—,60 and generally “all data observed about the data subject during the 
activities for the purpose of which the data are collected.”61 Examples of the latter are 
“transaction history or access log, . . . [d]ata collected through the tracking and recording 
of the data subject (such as an app recording heartbeat or technology used to track 
                                            
58 See also De Hert et al., supra note 35, at 202 (distinguishing between a restrictive and an extensive approach to 
data portability). 
59 WP29, supra note 16, at 10. 
60 Id. 
61 Id. at 10 n.21.  
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browsing behavior).”62 While WP29 explains that “provided” should be interpreted 
broadly, the term should exclude data that is “inferred” and “derived”—and thus created 
by the controller, such as via an analysis of provided data63—like assessments, profiles, 
scores, etc. 
 
While WP 29 most likely makes this distinction to balance data portability with the IP rights 
of controllers, its origins have nothing to do with IP. This classification of data seems to be 
adopted from the World Economic Forum and OECD discussions concerning privacy, and 
was first made during the OECD privacy expert roundtable in 2014.64 The experts then 
distinguished data that is provided, observed, derived, and inferred; the difference 
between the last two was that derived data was created in a “mechanical” way “to detect 
patterns . . . and create classifications” in a manner “not based on probabilistic reasoning,” 
while inferred data was “product of probability-based analytic processes.”65 The World 
Economic Forum adopted the classification merging the last two categories into one, 
“inferred”, to raise awareness as to the scale of personal data processing, and the various 
types of personal data that area processed.66 
 
The blurry conceptual boundaries of provided data will undoubtedly cause difficulties for 
the data subjects when invoking the RtDP. For instance, it is not clear what degree of 
controller input on top of the raw data will take data out of the scope of portability. While 
some cases are clearer—individual credit scores and profiles, for instance—others are not. 
Think of a photograph uploaded onto a photo sharing platform using a platform-provided 
filter. At the same time, an incidental benefit of this limitation is that controllers who are 
unwilling to share will be motivated to delete raw data when its processing is no longer 
strictly necessary. 
  
                                            
62 Id. 
63 Id. at 10. 
64 Org. for Econ. Co-operation and Dev. [OECD], Summary of the OECD Privacy Expert Roundtable on Protecting 
Privacy in a Data-driven Economy: Taking Stock of Current Thinking 5 (Mar. 21, 2014), 
http://www.oecd.org/officialdocuments/publicdisplaydocumentpdf/?cote=dsti/iccp/reg(2014)3&doclanguage=e
n; see also World Econ. Forum, Rethinking Personal Data: A New Lens for Strengthening Trust 5 (May 2014) 
http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_RethinkingPersonalData_ANewLens_Report_2014.pdf.   
65 OECD, supra note 64, at 5. 
66 Id. 
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III. Silent Conflict with IP Rights 
 
The RtDP is subject to further limitations in the interests of third parties as laid down in 
Article 20(4) GDPR. These could be data protection rights of other platform users67 but also 
IP rights—particularly copyright protecting software and trade secrets.68 The GDPR is silent 
on the extent of the conflict with these interests. While the RtDP creates incentives to 
reuse data, it might limit incentives to create or collect them. 
 
One may argue that limiting the RtDP to “provided data,” as opposed to data that is 
“derived” or “inferred”, is a result of regulatory balancing of a data protection right and 
the IP rights conducted by the legislator. This would for instance prevent competitors from 
benefiting from ready consumer profiles or reverse-engineering of an algorithm from 
inferred data. Yet, WP29 provided further guidelines on how to balance the RtDP with IP 
rights when complying with GDPR. For instance, when discussing the data format, WP29 
suggests that the data should be provided “along with useful metadata at the best possible 
level of granularity” and that “[t]his metadata should be enough to make the function and 
reuse of the data possible but, of course, without revealing trade secrets.”69 At the same 
time, “the result of those considerations should not be a refusal to provide all information 
to the data subject” and “data controllers can transmit the personal data . . . in a form that 
does not release information covered by trade secrets or IP rights.”70 
 
Interestingly, in the absence of an IP-specific clarification in Recital 68, WP29 seems to 
base its interpretation on Recital 63, which provides an explanation to the limitation of the 
right of access under Article 15(4): 
 
A data subject should have the right of access . . . and to exercise that right easily and at 
reasonable intervals . . . That right should not adversely affect the rights or freedoms of 
others, including trade secrets or intellectual property and in particular the copyright 
protecting the software. However, the result of those considerations should not be a 
refusal to provide all information to the data subject.71 
 
                                            
67 See WP29, supra note 16 (devoting substantial attention to how data protection rights of other data subjects 
should be respected when portable data concerns data subjects other than the one invoking the RtDP—think of 
the contact lists or email recipients). 
68 Id. at 12.  
69 Id. at 18. 
70 Id. at 12.  
71 See GDPR, supra note 4, at recital 63 of the preamble (emphasis added). 
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That WP29 draws an analogy between the right of access and the RtDP when it comes to 
the interface with IP rights is understandable, given the RtDP’s legislative history and its 
historical link to access. In addition, the outcome of this analogy is favorable to the RtDP: 
“the result of those considerations should not be a refusal to provide all information to the 
data subject.”72 WP29 appears to assume that requested data can be easily stripped of its 
IP components: 
[a] potential business risk cannot . . . in and of itself 
serve as the basis for a refusal to answer the portability 
request and data controllers can transfer the personal 
data provided by data subjects in a form that does not 
release information covered by trade secrets or 
intellectual property rights.73 
 
Yet, we contend that WP29 underestimates the extent of potential conflict between the 
RtDP and the IP rights. The interplay with existing IP rights is and will be more complex in 
practice. IP and data portability rights will touch and they will have to be reconciled. In the 
next Section, we examine these conflicts more closely. 
 
D. The Right to Data Portability, IP Law and Consequences 
 
The previous Section showed that Article 20 of the GDPR aspires to achieve general-
purpose reallocation of control over privately held data, subject to some conditions. Rather 
than a tool to further the objectives of data protection law, the RtDP seems to aim mainly 
at stimulating competition and innovation in data-driven markets. As such, its application 
raises questions about how the RtDP will interact with the incentives of firms to innovate 
and compete. While the RtDP’s regulatory DNA lies in improving access to privately held 
personal data, access to data through portability has a flip side for the addressees—the 
private parties collecting, analyzing, and trading in the data. Beyond mere compliance, the 
instrument acts as a push measure by forcing the private party to disclose, at least, a 
certain type of data and to share it with others upon the request of the data subject. This 
possibility undoubtedly influences the business strategy and potentially also market 
incentives concerning data creation and reuse which will be discussed in this section. 
 
I. Place in Innovation Policy 
 
The state can play several roles in supporting data-enabled innovation. Apart from creating 
a general ecosystem of economic and political institutions, the state may: (1) offer IP rights 
                                            
72 WP29, supra note 16, at 12. 
73 Id. 
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in data as an incentive for data creation and reuse; (2) intervene on the side of demand74—
for instance through prizes, or supply75—as was done in the PSI Directive; or (3) improve its 
institutions to better facilitate some form of market exchanges. Data portability 
instruments constitute an active intervention on the side of supply of information under 
point (2). Such intervention, however, interferes with other policies, in particular rewards 
promised through IP rights under point (1). 
 
IP rights are usually the most systemic intervention, as they reflect the government’s belief 
that incentives can induce further production or commercialization for the entire class of 
innovation. For that reason, IP rights usually come equipped with an exclusivity prerogative 
that makes certain types of uses of a protected investment subject to the consent of right 
holders. Right holders are then expected to commercialize them through markets, either 
on their own or through licensing. Three basic IP rights will likely be relevant for the 
relationship between IP law and the RtDP under the GDPR. 
 
Copyright is an exclusive right that protects original expressions, mostly coming from the 
domain of art and science.76 Such expressions can include photos, blog entries, tweets, 
sounds, or reviews. Sui generis database right protects databases which are a result of 
substantial investment in the collection, verification, or presentation of its data.77 This can 
include datasets that were tediously collected or cleaned, such as collections of user 
reviews and preferences. The exact investment threshold differs among the member 
states, but investments as low as 4,000 EUR were accepted to suffice in some countries.78 
Last but not least, trade secrets protect commercial information which has an economic 
                                            
74 In the area of data-enabled innovation, the state could offer prizes or research grants to facilitate or speed-up 
certain types of innovations. 
75 Public Sector Information (PSI) is an area where the state actively promotes reuse of data which is produced by 
the governments and its agencies. PSI policies—see the PSI Directive—are meant to spur broader availability of 
such data. This is supporting supply of information for data applications—such as travel navigators.  
76 See Directive 2001/29/EC, of the European Parliament and of the Council of May 22, 2001 on the 
Harmonisation of Certain Aspects of Copyright and Related Rights in the Information Society, 2001 O.J. (L 167) 10 
[hereinafter InfoSoc Directive]; see also CJEU, Case C‑5/08, Infopaq Int’l A/S v. Danske Dagblades Forening, 
ECLI:EU:C:2009:465, Judgement of July 16, 2009. 
77 See Directive 96/9/EC, of the European Parliament and of the Council of March 11, 1996 on the Legal Protection 
of Databases 1996 O.J. (L 77) 20 [hereinafter Database Directive]; see also CJEU, Case C-203/02, British 
Horseracing Board Ltd. V. William Hill Organization Ltd., ECLI:EU:C:2004:695, Judgement of November 9, 2004.  
78See BGH, Dec. 1, 2010, I ZR 196/08, https://juris.bundesgerichtshof.de/cgi-
bin/rechtsprechung/document.py?Gericht=bgh&Art=en&sid=ddaeb8a77db54f5f3e77f66c04e774ff&nr=56329&p
os=0&anz=1 (explaining that the German Federal Court of Justice accepted the amount of 4,000 EUR as 
sufficient); see also, Martin Husovec, The End of (Meta) Search Engines in Europe?, 14 CHI.-KENT J. OF INTELL. PROP. 
145, 145–72 (2014) (discussing the different thresholds across the EU). 
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value to a firm owing to its secrecy.79 Protected subject matter can include lists of 
customers, their shopping habits, and preferences or pricing strategy. Each right comes 
with a different set of exclusive rights. Copyright protects—among other things—against 
unauthorized reproduction and communication to the public.80 Sui generis database right 
protects against extraction and reutilization of substantial part of the database, or also of 
its insubstantial part if made systematically.81 And trade secrets protect against unlawful 
acquisition of secrets obtained through unauthorized access, appropriation, or any other 
conduct which, under the circumstances, is considered contrary to honest commercial 
practices.82 
 
To be sure, many data assets held by firms will not qualify for any IP protection because 
they do not meet the required threshold of protection.83 Such data assets are IP-free.84 
Requesting such information does not conflict with any IP right. A firm facing such 
disclosure will not be able to object to it on the basis of exclusive IP rights.85 IP-
                                            
79 Directive 2016/943, of the European Parliament and of the Council of June 8, 2016 on the Protection of 
Undisclosed Know-How and Business Information (Trade Secrets) Against Their Unlawful Acquisition, Use, and 
Disclosure, 2016 O.J. (L 157) 1 [hereinafter Trade Secret Directive]. 
80 See InfoSoc Directive, supra note 76, art. 2, 3. 
81 See Database Directive, supra note 77, art. 7. 
82 See Trade Secret Directive, supra note 79, art. 4(2). 
83 See generally Herbert Zech, INFORMATION ALS SCHUTZGEGENSTAND (2012); see also Herbert Zech, Information as 
Property, 6 JIPITEC, 192 (2015). 
84 At the moment, there is an ongoing policy debate and a lot of academic interest in ownership of data discussing 
who owns data, when and whether we need to introduce new exclusive rights, such as a right of data producers. 
See European Commission, Legal Study on Ownership and Access to Data, SMART No. 2016/0085 (2016); see also 
Anette Gärtner & Kate Brimsted, Let's Talk About Data Ownership, 39 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV., 461, 461–66; see also 
Daria Kim, No One’s Ownership as the Status Quo and a Possible Way Forward: A Note on the Public Consultation 
on Building a European Data Economy, 13 J. OF INTELL. PROP. L. & PRAC., 154 (2017).  
85 It might still invoke, however, a right to conduct business. See GDPR, supra note 4, art. 20(4). Such objections 
are probably less likely to be persuasive than ones backed with existing IP rights. This is because any ownership of 
this information is not a result of legal allocation by means of exclusive rights, but only a mere consequence of 
the service’s set-up, such as its technological design coupled with market power leveraged through contract law. 
The grey area between IP-encumbered and IP-free data might be information which are not covered by any 
exclusive rights but can be protected against misappropriation through unfair competition laws. Unless such 
tortious claims qualify for protection as a form “intellectual property” under Art. 17(2) of the Charter, they might 
be taken into account only within a right to conduct a business. Today, such doctrines are not harmonized on the 
EU level, and differ greatly across the countries. See Ansgar Ohly, Interfaces Between Trade Mark Protection and 
Unfair Competition Law: Confusion About Confusion and Misconceptions About Misappropriation?, in INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY, UNFAIR COMPETITION AND PUBLICITY: CONVERGENCES AND DEVELOPMENT 33 (Nari Lee et al. eds., 2014); see also 
Dirk Visser, Misrepresentation and Misappropriation: Two Common Principles or Common ‘Basic Moral Feelings’ 
of Intellectual Property and Unfair Competition Law, in COMMON PRINCIPLES OF EUROPEAN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 
247, 247–54 (Ansgar Ohly ed., 2012). 
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encumbered assets, however, will benefit from the fundamental rights protection offered 
by Article 17(2) of the Charter. But, with what consequences? WP29 argues that “[t]he 
right to data portability is not a right for an individual to misuse the information in a way 
that could be qualified as an unfair practice or that would constitute a violation of 
intellectual property rights.”86 
 
Of the three rights, copyright might be the easiest to strip from any data assets for the 
purposes of compliance. In practice, we can encounter four basic scenarios: (1) copyright is 
held by the data subjects; (2) copyright is held by the platform which either owns it 
originally (own creations) or on the basis of transfer/exclusive license; (3) copyright 
ownership is mixed for the content at stake; or (4) the copyright is held by third parties, 
such as friends who made pictures. As most of the platforms do not ask for transfer of 
rights or exclusive licenses for user-generated content, a lot of provided content will be 
owner by users. For sui generis database rights, such a distinction will be much more 
difficult. This is because sui generis rights are created as an additional layer of protection 
independently of materials such as texts, sound, images, numbers and facts—which are 
systematically or methodically arranged. The data controller, as a database maker, owns 
his exclusive rights regardless of the parallel rights the data controller holds. Structures as 
simple as XML or PDF were classified as a database in the case law.87 In the case of trade 
secrets, the same applies. The fact that information is provided by the user, does not 
exclude it from forming a basis of broader trade secret right.  
 
As such, IP rights send a signal to their beneficiaries that the activity they engage in will be 
rewarded through exclusive rights. The rights as such should ease recouping the costs of 
the investment. Data portability policies can conflict with this signal in several ways when 
data is IP-encumbered. The following three areas might be the main areas of daily friction. 
First, mandatory portability can force disclosure of data that could otherwise be kept away 
from competitors and thus preserved as an advantage in the process of competition. 
Second, it can prescribe sharing of data where exclusivity was previously promised as a 
reward. Third, it can undermine revenue that the potential beneficiary expected from her 
licensing activity and thus broadly innovation incentives. In the following Sections, we will 
analyze how the data portability regime embodied in Article 20 of the GDPR specifically 
interfaces with IP policies in this regard. It is argued that this general-purpose regime can 
easily become, at least in some situations, much more purpose-limited due to IP rights 
protecting the exclusivity of data. 
 
GDPR’s RtDP comes with four important innovations. First, the data must be provided in 
“structured, commonly used and machine-readable format.” This allows scalability. 
Second, data subjects have a right to “transmit those data to another controller without 
                                            
86 WP29, supra note 16, at 12. 
87 See Technomed Ltd. v. Bluecrest Health Screening Ltd. [2017] EWHC (Ch) 2142 [75]. 
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hindrance.”88 This allows aggregation and reuse. Third, the original data controller—
addressee of the request—is obliged to provide such information free of charge. This 
allows experimentation and lowers barriers to entry. Fourth, the regime aspires to achieve 
general-purpose access to privately held data. This means no extra evidence or justification 
is needed to mandate access. These four aspects might prove crucial in triggering the use 
of the instrument. Taken together with the scope of Article 20 of the GDPR, they will also 
have a defining impact on how the right will interact with IP rights. The fourth aspect 
might, however, become less pronounced in situations where a conflict between IP rights 
and the instrument will be encountered. 
 
II. Exclusivity of Data Assets 
 
IP rights lend exclusivity to their beneficiaries. Copyright and sui generis database right 
define acts which third parties cannot undertake without the permission of beneficiaries. 
Data portability guarantees that the data controller—and an unlimited number of third 
parties of his/her choice—might reuse the information for whatever purpose. Hence if the 
data asset is copyright protected—e.g., text of an email or a picture—, the situation can 
arise where, on the one hand, copyright law guarantees exclusivity of use to a piece of data 
and data portability, on the other hand, foresees possibility of its reuse. How will such 
conflict be resolved? Is the GDPR’s RtDP merely lex posterior or lex specialis that always 
overrides IP rights, or is Article 20(4) meant to invite to open-ended case-by-case 
reconciliation of the two? 
 
Two different situations must be distinguished in this regard: (1) disclosure and use by the 
data subject; and (2) use by the subsequent new data controllers. Moreover, what will 
matter in both cases, as this generally matters for IP law, what is the purpose of use of the 
data asset. 
 
If we agree with the WP29’s position on analogical application of Recital 63 to Article 20 of 
the GDPR, we could conclude that only adverse effects can compromise goals of data 
portability. This suggests somewhat higher standard than mere “interference.”89 
Moreover, then, the full refusal of information should be an extremely uncommon 
outcome of the balancing exercise—if possible at all. This suggests that counter-weighing 
justification would have to be very intensive to curtail the scope of initial disclosure and 
use by the data subject under point (1). No comparably strong language is found with 
regard to its reuse by subsequent data controllers under point (2). The condition “without 
hindrance” seems to apply to technical transfer of data. It is not entirely clear if it could 
also encapsulate conditions of its reuse. If this is not the case, then it would mean that 
                                            
88 See GDPR, supra note 4, art. 20(1). 
89 See Martin Husovec, Trademark Use Doctrine in the European Union and Japan, 21 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 1 
(2017) (explaining that in trademark law, “adverse effect” has its use in the area of trademark functions). 
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while point (1) is very hard to limit on the basis of IP rights, point (2) might be more 
common. It cannot, however, be ruled out that without hindrance assumes a broader 
meaning that generally steers the conflicts in favor of data protection. 
 
Could IP nevertheless impose limits on disclosure and use by the data subject 
himself/herself? The data subject’s social interest is stronger than one for its reuse by 
others. Private analyses of one’s own data can be more closely linked to data subject’s 
expression of personality and his/her sense of privacy than its subsequent commercial 
reuse. Moreover, more exceptions and limitations might cover such unauthorized uses. For 
some IP rights—such as copyright laws—exceptions for private use might exempt such 
uses anyway, so the conflict might be less pronounced. Therefore, IP rights are generally 
less likely to prevail in this area.90 
 
The situation might be more complex with regard to new subsequent data controllers. 
Their use is an expected consequence of a general-purpose data portability right but is also 
further away from the control rationale.91 This prompts the question about the obligations 
of follow-on data controllers regarding the original controller’s IP rights. To illustrate the 
tensions, consider the following examples. A user of a review website uploads her selfies 
from a vacation along with her review to the website, giving a non-exclusive license to the 
service without a possibility to sub-license. She is the copyright owner of the selfie or text 
and the service became its non-exclusive license. When she decides to export her data and 
import them with another service, relying on Article 20 of the GDPR, there is no conflict 
because the website’s rights are not in play. This would change, however, if the user and 
the service arrange for an exclusive license under which the service is the only entitled 
entity to exploit the copyrights in the text—thus becoming an exclusive copyright licensee. 
This can happen in the context of services that invest in user’s content by giving them 
something in exchange—for instance, discounts or remuneration.92 In such a situation, the 
user and others can be theoretically excluded from use of the text based on copyright law 
                                            
90 See Till Jaeger, Legal Opinion – Legal Aspects of European Electricity Data, JBB RECHTSANWÄLTE (2017), 
https://open-power-system-data.org/legal-opinion.pdf (discussing the limits on follow-on use of energy data). 
91 See WP29, supra note 16, at 4 (“The new right to data portability aims to empower data subjects regarding 
their own personal data, as it facilitates their ability to move, copy or transmit personal data easily from one IT 
environment to another.”).  
92 At the moment, an exclusive licensee seems like a rare model. Many services take a non-exclusive license with a 
possibility to sub-license. See Steven Hetcher, User-Generated Content and the Future of Copyright: Part Two - 
Agreements Between Users and Mega-Sites, 24 SANTA CLARA HIGH TECH. L. J. 829, 847 (2008) (discussing Facebook’s 
Terms of Service); Terms of Service, FACEBOOK (Apr. 19, 2018), https://www.facebook.com/terms.php; see also 
TripAdvisor Widget Terms of Use, TRIPADVISOR (Sept. 2017), 
https://www.tripadvisor.com/pages/widget_terms.html; Terms of Service, AIRBNB (Apr. 16, 2018), 
https://www.airbnb.com/terms; Twitter Terms of Service, TWITTER (May 25, 2018), https://twitter.com/en/tos; 
Terms of Service, YOUTUBE (May 25, 2018), https://www.youtube.com/static?template=terms&gl=US. Sometimes, 
however, the borderline between the user’s and site’s content can be murky. 
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(save for statutory exceptions), but remain free with regard to the picture. The RtDP allows 
the user to obtain the text and encourages to use it in a private sphere. Moreover, it allows 
the user to transmit it to any other service. Nevertheless, if such a service starts using the 
picture in the sense of copyright law,93 the question is whether it must acquire a license 
from the original data controller who holds the right. 
 
A similar situation might arise with respect to the sui generis database right. The original 
data controller could have invested heavily in attracting certain type of user-information—
for instance, consumer reviews of purchased products. As long as some of those reviews 
qualify as personal data—and are aggregated from several users—competing services 
would be able to extract and reutilize protected parts of the database. Again, such reuse by 
competitors directly intrudes into the exclusive right of a database maker—the original 
data controller. Just consider the example of Albert Heijn presented below. Will follow-on 
controllers have to seek a license to such a database, or will they be exempted? Moreover, 
what happens when the original IP rights owners, be it the copyright licensee in the first 
example or the database maker in the second, refuse to grant consent?  
 
It is clear that allowing exclusivity to take precedence over the reuse of ported information 
might endanger the policy goals of Article 20 of the GDPR. What benefit does a “right to 
transmit without hindrance” offer if it can be torpedoed by IP rights? In the area of IP, 
exceptions and limitations are always strictly tied to the purpose of the use of a given 
asset. This is probably most obvious when looking at the copyright landscape, which 
constrains any exceptions to a pre-defined catalogue of social causes.94 The mutual conflict 
of the RtDP and IP will not escape this reality. Therefore, the resolution will inevitably be 
use-specific as well. As a consequence, a general-purpose regime like the GDPR can break 
into a purpose-specific regime for reuse as soon as it hits IP rocks on its way. This would 
limit incentives for reuse. 
 
III. Disclosure of Data Assets 
 
Data portability by definition promotes disclosure of data. Such disclosure can, however, 
conflict with a firm’s plans to keep information secret in order to leapfrog competitors or 
prevent them from imitating its independently developed innovation. To give an example, 
shopping habits and history of customers constitute both personal data and trade 
secrets.95 They are collected for the purposes of safeguarding customer loyalty and 
                                            
93 For simplicity, assume a safe harbor scenario, such as the application of art. 14 of the E-Commerce Directive. 
94 See InfoSoc Directive, supra note 76, art. 5. 
95 As an illustration, Facebook has already invoked trade secret protection as a justification for not disclosing all 
personal data in response to an access request of an individual user. The social network provider claimed that one 
of the sections of the Irish Data Protection Acts, to which Facebook is subject because its international 
headquarters are in Ireland, “carves out an exception to subject access requests where the disclosures in 
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improving the quality of services or products. Although portability does not necessarily 
lead to public availability of data, Article 20 of the GDPR can in practice lead to sufficient 
relevant availability to data subjects and third parties that were entrusted with the reuse. 
Such parties certainly can include direct or indirect competitors. As a consequence, 
convincing the data subjects to request their data through general-purpose regimes could 
become a way for competitors to challenge each other’s data assets. It is easy to imagine 
how, for instance, energy suppliers start persuading their competitor’s customers to 
invoke portability regarding their past consumption in exchange for discounts if they 
switch to their own offering. Moreover, a user’s access to some of his or her consumption 
patterns as a type of observable data can lead to increased technological and business 
opportunities for personalized comparative advertising—e.g., consumption-pattern based 
comparison of prices. 
 
For instance, imagine a supermarket chain, such as Albert Heijn, that invests lot of money 
in convincing its customers to use its loyalty card. It offers customers special deals, 
promotes its use in advertising, and trains its employees to actively ask for the card while 
customers are paying. Such a card typically collects the full consumption pattern of a 
consumer, which is of great value and might qualify for protection under the sui generis 
database regime, or as a trade secret. A competing chain, such as Lidl, might be interested 
in luring the customers and offer them an easy option to simply compare the prices if they 
start shopping at its stores. Lidl uses ported data—falling within the scope of Article 20 of 
the GDPR—and summarizes the prices that would be paid for comparable products in its 
store. The result is greater market transparency, but also deterioration of Albert Heijn’s 
investment in collecting the data. 
 
Firms in the EU are entitled to trade secret protection as long as such information has a 
commercial value because of its secrecy and its owner takes reasonable steps to keep it 
secret.96 Unlike patent law, trade secret protection does not lend exclusive rights against 
the use of trade secrets that result from an independent discovery or market observation. 
97 This means that right holders cannot prohibit the use of their secrets if other firms arrive 
at them by investing in their own research and development. This includes a possibility to 
deduce them from an observation or testing of lawfully acquired products of their 
competitors.98  
                                                                                                                
response would adversely affect trade secrets or intellectual property.” See Email from Facebook to Max 
Schrems, (Sept. 28 2011), http://www.europe-v-facebook.org/FB_E-Mails_28_9_11.pdf. 
96 See Trade Secret Directive, supra note 79, art. 2(1). 
97 In IP scholarship, there is lively debate about whether trade secrets are a form of “intellectual property.” See 
Lionel Bentley, Trade Secrets: “Intellectual Property” but not “Property?”, in CONCEPTS OF PROPERTY IN INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY LAW 60 (Helena Howe & Jonathan Griffiths eds., 2013) (arguing that they are predominantly being 
accepted as “intellectual property,” but not “property”). 
98 See Trade Secret Directive, supra note 79, art. 3. 
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How far-reaching Article 20 of the GDPR is in limiting the expectation of a firm’s sphere of 
secrecy depends on the construction of its scope.99 The effect on data secrecy seems to be 
twofold—direct and indirect—depending on how the instrument influences it. While direct 
effects take away secrecy by curbing it, the indirect effect broadens factual and legal 
possibilities of its lawful disclosure. 
 
First, the direct effect concerns all the data that are considered “the personal data 
concerning [the data subject], which he or she has provided to a controller.” Only this type 
of data can be subject to a successful request for disclosure. The information obtained can 
then be transmitted to third parties or reused by the data subject. Such disclosure or 
subsequent use is secrecy-destroying when it can be said that otherwise protected 
information now became “generally known among or readily accessible to persons within 
the circles that normally deal with the kind of information in question.”100  
 
The disclosure towards the data subject could be interpreted either: (1) as automatically 
secrecy-destroying; or (2) potentially secrecy-destroying.  
 
If we were to accept the first reading, it would mean that data portability would in fact 
never directly conflict with the right to trade secrets. It conflicts only with the expectation 
of secrecy. By limiting the remit of possible secrecy, it curtails the effective scope of where 
trade secret rights might arise or be maintained. A parallel can be drawn with consumer 
transparency regimes, under which companies are asked to publicly disclose some 
information. Under such reading, portability or transparency obligations strip firms of 
possibilities to preserve secrecy about certain aspects of their business. As such, Article 20 
of the GDPR would co-define what can qualify as a trade secret—and thus IP—within the 
meaning of Article 17(2) of the Charter.  
 
If we were to accept the second reading, Article 20 of the GDPR would be secrecy-
destroying only where the entitled data subject requested protected information and 
simultaneously entrusted its reuse with a third party which comes from “within the circles 
that normally deal with the kind of information in question.”101 This would mean that trade 
secrecy rights arise over subjected assets, and continue to exist despite compliance with 
the request based on Article 20 of the GDPR until the point when relevant circles 
effectively acquire such information. Only at such moment would trade secret rights 
evaporate. If the analysis proceeds in this way, then the argument can be made that 
imminent disclosure based on Article 20 of the GDPR has a potential to endanger further 
                                            
99 See supra Section C.II. 
100 See Trade Secret Directive, supra note 79, art. 2(1)(a). 
101 See id. 
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existence of trade secret rights and must be balanced against the right itself—provided 
that they qualify under protection of Article 17(2) of the Charter.102 Such analysis would 
have to be made on a case-by-case basis. The adoption of any of two viewpoints might 
affect where the line of balance with secrecy is drawn.  
 
In any case, data portability also may have an indirect impact on trade secrecy. This impact 
is perhaps even more significant. Because the RtDP targets provided information, which is 
interpreted as input and observed data about the data subject, this data is less likely to be 
the most economically indispensable for the firm. Such accessibility of input and/or 
observed data, however, can help to reverse-engineer otherwise unreachable data—for 
instance inferred data—which is not subject to portability. By being able to analyze the 
exact input/observed data of the service together with the resulting services might provide 
for better chances of uncovering the key trade secrets. The data portability might thus help 
to broaden the factual scope of reverse engineering which in consequence again limits 
trade secret rights. 
 
IV. Licensing Revenue from Data Assets 
 
Exclusivity rarely constitutes an end in and of itself for firms. More often, firms engage in 
licensing through which they exchange their prerogative against monetary compensation. 
Therefore, even in situations where the right holder will be forced to relinquish any right to 
authorize follow-on use of their protected data assets, firms might still benefit from such 
compensation. The fact that right holders are obliged to respect the reuse of information 
by other firms does not imply that such reuse of data must remain without remuneration. 
Article of the 20 GDPR does not mention any fees. Unlike the right of data access,103 it does 
not link the exercise of the right to any obligation to reimburse the original data controller 
under some circumstances. As a result, the general clause of Article 11(5) of the GDPR 
applies which states that actions taken to comply with data subjects’ rights shall be 
provided free of charge, unless requests from a data subject are manifestly unfounded or 
excessive (in particular because of their repetitive character). In the latter cases, the 
controller may charge a reasonable fee taking into account administrative costs. Free-of-
charge provision of data, however, does not automatically mean that the reuse of IP rights 
must also be without any monetary compensation. 
 
Arguably, one of the ways to achieve balancing would be to reconcile goals of IP rights with 
goals of data portability by means of establishing an occasional condition of fair 
remuneration. This would effectively mean that the RtDP is allowed to operate and be 
                                            
102 See also Bentley, supra note 97, at 77 (discussing the Veolia case and whether disclosure would be in conflict 
with Article 8 ECHR or Article 1 of the First Protocol of the ECHR). 
103 See GDPR, supra note 4, art. 15(3) (“For any further copies requested by the data subject, the controller may 
charge a reasonable fee based on administrative costs.”). 
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used. But if it is relied on by third parties who would otherwise have to seek a license to 
use the assets, they would not be exempted from an obligation to pay fair remuneration. 
Such schemes that promote access to technology and IP rights exist in the area of 
standardization.104 Here, they are the result of private commitments by firms that 
participate in the standardization process and hold patent rights that read on 
implementation of the standards. A balancing exercise between Article 20 of the GDPR and 
IP rights could take these private ordering schemes as an inspiration to reconcile two 
policies in cases where IP rights are closely tight to the revenue of firms.105 
This is not to say that such remuneration schemes should always be the result of such 
balancing. It is to say only that its possibility, as a middle ground, will prevent less polarized 
thinking about the conflicts between the two interests. It also means that recognized 
remuneration interests will not be sufficient to prevent disclosure and reuse. In this sense, 
such schemes can broaden the effects of data portability policies when applied to 
IP-encumbered data assets. From the perspective of many IP rights, the goals are still 
achieved when an obligation to pay substitutes exclusivity. In the area of IP, many private 
ordering or legislative solutions exist that sometimes transform a right to exclude into a 
less intrusive right to be paid.106 This can potentially reduce incentives to create, collect, 
and clean the data. The need for any incentives to induce such activities otherwise than by 
market competition, however, is largely disputed.107 
 
Nonetheless, the concept of fair remuneration is not without administration costs. It would 
almost certainly lead to several complications. First, there is a lot of hope that the RtDP can 
be standardized. In order to achieve scalability and automation, this must happen. The 
more case-by-case considerations there are, the more difficult it is to embody them into 
standardized solutions. It is already hard to identify IP-encumbered assets, as some of the 
protection thresholds—such as substantive investment—are invisible to an outside 
observer.108 Perhaps the solution would be similar to the area of patent licensing of 
standard-essential patents109—to simply put the burden of the first step onto the right 
                                            
104 See generally JRC Science and Policy Report on Fair, Reasonable and Non-Discriminatory (FRAND) Licensing 
Terms, (2015), http://is.jrc.ec.europa.eu/pages/ISG/EURIPIDIS/documents/05.FRANDreport.pdf.  
105 Inge Graef & Martin Husovec, Response to the Public Consultation on “Building a European Data Economy,” 
TILBURG LAW SCHOOL RESEARCH PAPER SERIES No. 10/2017 (Apr. 25, 2017) (discussing this trade-off between short 
term and long term). 
106 Examples include private levies for private reproduction, licensing through collective management 
organizations, FRAND-licensing in the area of standardization, compulsory licensing, etc. 
107 See Drexl, supra note 40; see also P. Bernt Hugenholtz, Something Completely Different: Europe’s Sui Generis 
Database Right, in THE INTERNET AND THE EMERGING IMPORTANCE OF NEW FORMS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (Susy Frankel 
& Daniel Gervais eds., 2016); Wolfgang Kerber, A New (Intellectual) Property Right for Non-Personal Data? An 
Economic Analysis, GRUR INT. 989, 989–98 (2016); Husovec, supra note 78, at 145–72. 
108 See Husovec, supra note 78, at 145–72 (discussing this aspect in the context of database sui generis right). 
109 CJEU, Case C-170/13, Huawei Technologies Co. v. ZTE Corp., ECLI:EU:C:2015:477, Judgement of July 16, 2015.  
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holders who in licensing disputes must first alert the alleged infringer of the infringement 
complained about and clarify which patent and how it was infringed. Nonetheless, one 
should think about the practicality of technical and institutional set-up of the market 
surrounding such a licensing exchange before embarking on this path of balancing. 
 
V. Impact on Data-Driven Markets 
 
It is clear that Article 20 of the GDPR will have an impact beyond individual data subjects 
who can invoke the RtDP. By imposing restrictions on the extent to which market players 
can process personal data, data protection law structures markets and influences the 
competitive process. As such, most data protection rules raise entry barriers to the data 
economy because they subject the collection and use of personal data to additional 
requirements. The RtDP, however, can also make it easier for market players to collect 
personal data and thereby facilitate market entry. In its Guidelines on Data Portability, 
WP29 explicitly stated that the RtDP “is also an important tool that will support the free 
flow of personal data in the EU and foster competition between controllers.”110 As such, 
markets could become more open to new entrants and thus more competitive by making 
the control incumbents have over data less durable.111 While the RtDP stimulates 
competition and thereby can have a positive impact by facilitating diffusion and reuse of 
data, it also imposes a compliance burden on market players.112 Article 20 of the GDPR will 
apply to all controllers irrespective of their size, the scale of their processing activities, and 
the purpose for which portability is sought. The RtDP may pose some problems, as every 
sector will face its own difficulties with regard to its implementation. In some sectors, key 
players already provide their users with certain functionalities for exporting data—in the 
form of services like Facebook’s Download Your Info and Google Takeout.113 In other 
                                            
110 WP29, supra note 16, at 3. 
111 See also Lynskey, supra note 34, at 804–06. 
112 See Swire & Lagos, supra note 35, at 352; see also Legal Memo with Respect to the Article 29 Guidelines on the 
Right to Data Portability, EUROPEAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS NETWORK OPERATORS' ASSOCIATION 8–9, (Feb. 16, 2017) 
https://etno.eu/datas/positions-
papers/2017/170131%20ETNO_Data%20Portability_Memo/170131%20ETNO_Data%20Portability_Memo.pdf 
[hereinafter ETNO Memo] (arguing that the interpretation of the RtDP as put forward by WP29—namely that the 
concept of data “provided by the data subject” includes not only data actively and knowingly inserted by a data 
subject, but also data obtained by observing the behavior of a data subject—places a disproportionate obligation 
on telecom operators which are already subject to portability duties under the EU framework for electronic 
communications).  
113 See Accessing & Downloading Your Information, FACEBOOK (2018) 
https://www.facebook.com/help/131112897028467; see also Download Your Data, GOOGLE, 
https://takeout.google.com/settings/takeout; see also Introducing Data Transfer Project: an open source platform 
promoting universal data portability, GOOGLE OPEN SOURCE BLOG (Jul. 20, 2018), 
https://opensource.googleblog.com/2018/07/introducing-data-transfer-project.html (stating that in July 2018, 
Google Facebook, Microsoft and Twitter announced the Data Transfer Project which is “an open source initiative 
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sectors, like telecommunications,114 any such relevant experience is lacking and no 
interoperable standards and formats are yet available. Does the RtDP create an obligation 
for market players to develop and agree upon a common format if none exists yet? This 
remains open. 
 
As a general-purpose regime, Article 20 of the GDPR may have a broader impact on the 
competitive landscape. In particular, it remains to be seen whether access to ported data 
under the RtDP will create a level playing field or whether instead incumbents will continue 
to retain a competitive advantage. This could be due to the continuous access to the 
real-time flow of first-hand data that incumbents possess, as opposed to ad hoc 
second-hand data access of new entrants. It should also be noted in this regard that the 
data access of new entrants is dependent on whether individual data subjects invoke their 
RtDP. The new right gives only individuals the right to receive and transfer data to a new 
controller. As such, the RtDP is not concerned with the ability of businesses themselves to 
directly get access to data in order to compete on a market.115 In this sense, data subjects 
remain in control, although, as was explained earlier, they can be easily seduced and 
instrumentalized by businesses. 
 
Moreover, because the RtDP will apply horizontally, new entrants and incumbents alike are 
able to use it for their respective ends. As a result, the impact on competition may go both 
ways. On the one hand, data portability may foster competition, facilitate reuse of ported 
data, and stimulate the creation of innovative data analytics services.116 In this regard, it is 
important to keep in mind that the RtDP will not only enable the transfer of data to a 
direct competitor, but also facilitates users to take advantage of complementary, value-
added services such as product comparison services.117 On the other hand, some measure 
of standardization and interoperability of data formats—as well as data processing 
procedures—might be required in order to make portability meaningful. Standardization 
can help to implement the RtDP in a cost-effective way and thus increase its positive 
effects. A possible negative consequence of standardization, however, is that once a 
particular standard is chosen, the development of new technologies stagnates. This is 
because market players will be inclined to provide products and services complying with 
                                                                                                                
dedicated to developing tools that will enable consumers to transfer their data directly from one service to 
another, without needing to download and re-upload it.”).  
114 See ETNO Memo, supra note 112, at 7–8. 
115 See Aysem Diker Vanberg & Mehmet Bilal Ünver, The Right to Data Portability in the GDPR and EU Competition 
Law: Odd Couple or Dynamic Duo?, 8 EUR. J. OF L. & TECH. 1, 2 (2017). 
116 See also Rubinstein, supra note 35, at 80. 
117 See Barbara Engels, Data Portability Among Online Platforms, 5 INTERNET POL’Y REV. 6–10 (2016) (making a 
distinction between platforms offering substitute and complementary services when examining the possible 
impact of the right to data portability on competition and innovation). 
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the agreed standard.118 While the exact impact of the RtDP on the competitive landscape 
remains to be seen, it is clear that its implementation will influence innovation incentives 
and innovation paths depending on the breadth of its scope of application as well as the 
resolution of its trade-off with IP rights.  
 
E. Data Portability as an Emerging Concept Beyond the GDPR 
 
From the perspective of EU law, it is important to note that the RtDP is not an isolated 
phenomenon. An increasing number of initiatives are emerging to replicate the GDPR’s 
generalist design in the area of consumer protection law and free movement law. In this 
Section, we first explore the only pre-GDPR regime that facilitated portability—
competition law—and in turn look at designs of other upcoming policies and their internal 
and external consistencies. 
 
I. Data Portability and Competition Law  
 
The possible enforcement of data portability under competition law differs from the way in 
which the RtDP is to be implemented under data protection law. First, it is important to 
note that the GDPR gives data subjects a right to data portability, while competition 
authorities can impose a duty on dominant providers to enable data portability in case 
their behavior amounts to abuse under Article 102 of the TFEU. Second, the scope of 
application of the two regimes is different. As it forms part of a data protection 
instrument, the RtDP naturally applies only to transfers of personal data. Information that 
does not qualify as personal data prima facie falls outside the scope of the new right. In 
addition, a data subject is entitled to only port personal data which he or she has provided 
to a controller under Article 20(1) GDPR. Regardless of how this phrase will eventually be 
interpreted,119 it is clear that such a limitation does not play a role in the enforcement of 
competition law.  
 
Under competition law, action can potentially be taken against a lack of portability of any 
data, irrespective of whether it relates to an identified or identifiable natural person and 
whether it is provided by this person as long as it qualifies as anticompetitive behavior. The 
scope of application of competition law in this regard is thus much wider. At the same 
time, it must be kept in mind that action on the basis of Article 102 of the TFEU—the most 
relevant provision for enforcing data portability under competition law—can be taken only 
if the restrictions on data portability qualify as abuse of dominance with the specific 
                                            
118 See Francisco Costa-Cabral & Orla Lynskey, Family Ties: The Intersection Between Data Protection and 
Competition in EU Law, 54 COMMON MKT L. REV. 11, 39 (2017) (arguing that standard-setting to ensure a good 
functioning of the right to data portability “may necessitate an agreement between competitors and therefore 
entail a potential violation of Article 101 TFEU”). 
119 See discussion supra Section C.II. regarding the concepts of derived and inferred data. 
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purpose of remedying harm to competition.120 In contrast, the RtDP will apply generally to 
all forms of processing carried out by automated means and based on consent or on a 
contract irrespective of the purpose for which portability is sought.121 No dominance or 
abuse will need to be established for users to be able to transfer their data under the 
GDPR.122  
 
Both data protection and competition law can thus be used to facilitate data portability, 
albeit in different ways. While data protection law grants individual data subjects a RtDP 
vis-à-vis data controllers in general, a competition intervention is only possible when a lack 
of data portability leads to competitive harm in the specific circumstances of the case. 
Unlike data protection law—which protects individual data subjects—competition law is 
concerned with protecting consumer welfare more broadly by safeguarding the 
competitive process to benefit consumers, competitors, and the economy as a whole. By 
intervening against anticompetitive practices, competition enforcement aims to keep 
markets open and protect consumers by ensuring a genuine choice of good quality 
products and services. The application of competition law is, however, triggered only in the 
presence of actual, proven competition problems. This explains why the resulting remedy 
adopted under competition law will be purpose-specific.  
 
Even before the GDPR was adopted, former Competition Commissioner Almunia made 
clear in a speech that the RtDP “goes to the heart of competition policy,” and that 
“portability of data is important for those markets where effective competition requires 
that customers can switch by taking their own data with them.”123 By stating “[w]hether 
this is a matter for regulation or competition policy, only time will tell,” he acknowledged 
the right to data portability as a new tool under data protection law but at the same time 
did not eliminate competition law intervention for facilitating data portability.124 The 
European Commission or national competition authorities therefore may also intervene on 
the basis of competition law if a dominant firm does not allow users to take their data with 
them when switching services.125  
                                            
120 See also Lynskey, supra note 34, at 801–02 (comparing the personal and material scope of the GDPR right 
versus the competition law remedy of data portability). 
121 These are the preconditions for the right to data portability to apply under Art. 20(1)(a) and (b) GDPR. 
122 See MARC BOURREAU ET AL., BIG DATA AND COMPETITION POLICY: MARKET POWER, PERSONALISED PRICING AND ADVERTISING 
25 (2017), http://cerre.eu/sites/cerre/files/170216_CERRE_CompData_FinalReport.pdf (comparing enforcements 
of data portability on the basis of data protection and competition law in).  
123 Press Release, Joaquin Almunia, Competition Comm’r, European Comm’n, Remarks on Competition and 
Personal Data Protection at the Privacy Platform Event: Competition and Privacy in Markets of Data in Brussels, 
(Nov. 26, 2012), http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-12-860_en.htm.  
124 Id. 
125 See, e.g., Inge Graef et al., Mandating Portability and Interoperability in Online Social Networks: Regulatory and 
Competition Law Issues in the European Union, 39 TELECOMM. POL’Y 502, 508–09 (2015); see also Inge Graef et al., 
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The Facebook/WhatsApp merger decision—in which the Commission assessed whether 
data portability issues constituted a barrier to the switching of consumers in the context of 
consumer communications applications—is instructive in this perspective. The Commission 
made clear that it had not found any evidence suggesting that this was indeed the case. 
According to the Commission, communication via apps tends to consist to a significant 
extent of short and spontaneous chats which do not necessarily carry long-term value for 
consumers. The Commission also considered that the messaging history remains accessible 
on a user’s smartphone even if the user starts using a different communications app. 
Finally, the Commission took into account that the contact list can be easily ported 
because a competing application—after obtaining consent of the user—would get access 
to his or her phone book on the basis of which existing contacts can be identified.126 Even 
though the Commission did not consider restrictions on data portability to constitute 
barriers to switching in the specific circumstances of the case, the fact that these issues 
were investigated under merger review illustrates the potential of competition law to 
address data portability. 
 
This can be further illustrated by the Google abuse of dominance case in which the 
Commission previously negotiated with Google about commitments which would force the 
search engine provider to stop imposing obligations on advertisers preventing them from 
moving their advertising campaigns to competing platforms.127 In the United States, the 
Federal Trade Commission closed its investigation when Google offered voluntary 
concessions to remove restrictions on AdWords that made it difficult for advertisers to 
manage advertising campaigns across multiple platforms.128 By restricting the possibility of 
advertisers to move their campaigns to another advertising platform, providers create 
switching costs that may cause advertisers to stay with their current provider solely 
because they find it too cumbersome to manually re-insert their advertising campaign in a 
new platform. This case shows that competition authorities on both sides of the Atlantic 
are ready to remedy a lack of data portability as a competition issue. 
                                                                                                                
Putting the Right to Data Portability into a Competition Law Perspective, LAW. J. OF THE HIGHER SCH. OF ECON. ANN. 
REV. 7–8 (2013). 
126 Case No COMP/M.7217, October 3, 2014, paras. 113–15, 134, 2014 O.J., 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/decisions/m7217_20141003_20310_3962132_EN.pdf. 
127 For Commitments of Google, see Case COMP/C-3/39.740 Foundem and others, April 3, 2013, paras. 27–31, 
2013 O.J., http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/cases/dec_docs/39740/39740_8608_5.pdf; see also Joaquin 
Almunia, Competition Comm’r, European Comm’n, Remarks on the Google Antitrust Case: What is at Stake?, (Oct. 
1, 2013), http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-13-768_en.htm (stating that Google offered improved 
commitments to the Commission which included a new proposal providing stronger guarantees against 
circumvention of the earlier commitments regarding portability of advertising campaigns). 
128 Google Agrees to Change Its Business Practices to Resolve FTC Competition Concerns in the Markets for Devices 
Like Smart Phones, Games and Tablets, and in Online Search, FTC (Jan. 3 2013), http://www.ftc.gov/news-
events/press-releases/2013/01/google-agrees-change-its-business-practices-resolve-ftc. 
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In particular, a refusal of a dominant firm to facilitate data portability may constitute a 
form of abuse by exploiting consumers or excluding competitors. A lack of data portability 
may exploit consumers when it restricts their choice of competing offers. In the context of 
exclusionary abuse, a lack of data portability may lead to barriers of entry for competitors 
and violate Article 102(b) of the TFEU by limiting markets and technical development to 
the prejudice of consumers.129 Data portability may also be adopted as a remedy to 
address related exploitative or exclusionary abuses and thus be used as a tool to restore 
competition in the market. For instance, a requirement of data portability could remedy an 
exploitative abuse consisting of the excessive extraction of personal data from 
consumers.130 By forcing a dominant provider to give users the possibility to transfer their 
data to a competitor, a competition authority can thus address relevant exploitative or 
exclusionary abuses. Beyond portability, a duty to share data can be imposed on a 
dominant firm under Article 102 of the TFEU if the strict requirements of the so-called 
essential facilities doctrine are met.131 In particular, the data has to be indispensable for 
competitors to introduce their own products or services on the market.132 In a merger 
setting, remedies of data portability or data sharing may play a role as tools to prevent a 
merger from “significantly imped[ing] effective competition.”133 The remedy adopted by 
the Commission in the 2008 Thomson/Reuters merger decision provides precedent for 
such an approach. The Commission approved the merger on the condition that the 
merging parties would divest copies of their databases containing financial information. 
This remedy would allow purchasers of the databases to quickly establish themselves as a 
credible competitive force in the marketplace in competition with the merged entity.134 
                                            
129 See Christopher Yoo, When Antitrust Met Facebook, 19 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1147, 1154–55 (2012); see also 
Damien Geradin & Monika Kuschewsky, Competition Law and Personal Data: Preliminary Thoughts on a Complex 
Issue 11, (SSRN Working Paper, 2013), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2216088. 
130 See Francisco Costa-Cabral, The Preliminary Opinion of the European Data Protection Supervisor and the 
Discretion of the European Commission in Enforcing Competition Law, 23 MAASTRICHT J. EUR. AND COMP. L. 495, 511 
(2016). 
131 See INGE GRAEF, EU COMPETITION LAW, DATA PROTECTION AND ONLINE PLATFORMS: DATA AS ESSENTIAL FACILITY 249–80 
(2016) (discussing in detail the application of the essential facilities doctrine to data). 
132 See, e.g., CJEU, Joined Cases C-241/91 and C-242/91, Radio Telefis Eireann and Indep. Television Publ’ns Ltd v. 
Comm’n of the European Communities, ECLI:EU:C:1995:98, Judgement of April 6, 1995; CJEU, Case C-7/97, Oscar 
Bronner GmbH & Co. KG v. Mediaprint Zeitungs, ECLI:EU:C:1998:569, Judgement of November 26, 1998; CJEU, 
Case C-418/01, IMS Health GmbH & Co. OHG v. NDC Health GmbH & Co. KG, ECLI:EU:C:2004:257, Judgement of 
April 29, 2004; CJEU, Microsoft Corp. v. Comm’n of the European Communities, Case T-201/04, 
ECLI:EU:T:2007:289, Judgement of September 17, 2007. 
133 Council Regulation (EC) 139/2004 of Jan. 20, 2004 on the Control of Concentrations Between Undertakings (EU 
Merger Regulation), art. 2(3), 2004 O.J. (L 24) 1, 7. 
134 Case No COMP/M.4726 February 19, 2008, 2008 O.J., 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/decisions/m4726_20080219_20600_en.pdf. 
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The extent of control over data that competition law may give thus amounts to the 
imposition of certain limitations on market players as to how they use their datasets to 
compete.135 Competition law can play an important role in promoting data portability and 
data sharing as well, although its scope is limited to a case-by-case analysis of competition 
concerns. Because of their potential to facilitate data access and reuse more widely, 
general-purpose data portability regimes, such as Article 20 of the GDPR, may restructure 
markets beyond what competition law is able to achieve with its case-by-case approach. At 
the same time, competition authorities do have a certain margin of discretion to adopt 
remedies that relate to the identified competition concerns once the competition rules are 
triggered. This is particularly the case in two scenarios. In a merger setting, the merging 
parties are dependent on the discretion of the competition authority to prevent the 
merger from being blocked. As a result, the authority has scope to require remedies that 
have a broader impact on the market, as long as they can be linked to the identified 
competition concerns.136 Where undertakings offer commitments to end a competition 
investigation without establishing an infringement, there is even more room for 
competition authorities to do so. The Court of Justice has made explicit in Alrosa that 
undertakings proposing commitments “consciously accept that the concessions they make 
may go beyond what the Commission could itself impose on them” in an infringement 
decision.137 If offered by undertakings or solicited by competition authorities, remedies of 
data portability and data sharing may be used in such settings to structure the affected 
markets.138 A link with the identified competition concerns is, however, necessary, so that 
the intervention remains purpose-specific. 
 
II. Data Portability, Consumer Protection Law, and Beyond 
 
After the adoption of the GDPR, a form of data portability has been put forward in the 
proposal for a Digital Content Directive,139 published by the Commission in December 
2015. This proposal would introduce a general-purpose tool, granting consumers some 
                                            
135 See Barbara Van der Auwermeulen, How to Attribute the Right to Data Portability in Europe: A Comparative 
Analysis of Legislations, (2017) 33 COMPUTER L. & SECURITY REV. 57, 63 (“It cannot be excluded that article 102 of the 
TFEU may apply to some anti-competitive situations resulting from restrictions on data portability. Nevertheless, 
it appears to be challenging to apply European Competition Law to data portability.”). 
136 See Inge Graef et al., Fairness and Enforcement: Bridging Competition, Data Protection, and Consumer Law, 
INT’L DATA PRIVACY L. (forthcoming 2018). 
137 CJEU, European Comm’n v. Alrosa Co., Case C-441/07 P, ECLI:EU:C:2010:377, para. 48 (June 29, 2010). 
138 See also Costa-Cabral, supra note 130, at 511. 
139 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on Certain Aspects Concerning Contracts 
for the Supply of Digital Content, COM (2015) 634 final (Dec. 9, 2015) [hereinafter Proposal for a Digital Content 
Directive]. 
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degree of control over data in consumer protection law. Article 13(2)(c) of the proposal 
requires a supplier to provide a consumer who terminates a contract for the supply of 
digital content “with technical means to retrieve all content provided by the consumer and 
any other data produced or generated through the consumer’s use of the digital content to 
the extent that data has been retained by the supplier.” The provision goes on to state that 
the consumer is “entitled to retrieve the content free of charge, without significant 
inconvenience, in reasonable time and in a commonly used data format.”140 Interestingly, 
the proposal postulates an obligation of the supplier to refrain from the use of data 
retrieved by the consumer after contract termination.141 This creates stronger property-
like control over ported data than Article 20 of the GDPR, as the data must be removed 
from the service altogether. 
 
As such, the proposal for a Digital Content Directive does not entitle consumers to have 
their digital content directly transmitted to a new provider. This difference from the RtDP 
under the GDPR can be explained by the distinct underlying objective of the Digital Content 
Directive. While the RtDP aims to give data subjects more control over their personal data 
generally, the relevant provisions in the proposal for a Digital Content Directive have the 
more specific objective to ensure that consumers benefit from effective protection in 
relation to the right to terminate the contract.142 The extent of control granted to 
consumers under the data retrieval obligations of the Digital Content Directive is thus 
limited to cases of contract termination, but seems stronger in the level of control it 
confers. Nevertheless, as the proposal for a Digital Content Directive does not specify that 
data should be retrieved for a particular purpose for the data retrieval obligations to apply, 
it can be regarded as a general-purpose regime just like Article 20 of the GDPR. 
 
When making a further comparison, it becomes clear that the scope of data covered under 
the data retrieval obligations of the proposal for a Digital Content Directive is broader than 
the type of data to which the RtDP of the GDPR applies. Unlike the latter—which covers 
                                            
140 See id. at art. 16(4)(b) (providing for a similar obligation for suppliers with regard to long term contracts for the 
supply of digital content). Interestingly, art. 16(4)(b) does not state that consumers are entitled to receive the 
content free of charge and thus seems to allow suppliers to ask for a fee. 
141 See id. at art. 13(2)(b) 
([T]he supplier shall take all measures which could be expected in 
order to refrain from the use of the counter-performance other than 
money which the consumer has provided in exchange for the digital 
content and any other data collected by the supplier in relation to the 
supply of the digital content including any content provided by the 
consumer with the exception of the content which has been 
generated jointly by the consumer and others who continue to make 
use of the content.). 
142 See id. at recital 39 of the preamble. 
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only personal data provided by the data subject—the proposal for a Digital Content 
Directive also enables a consumer to retrieve any other data—to the extent that it has 
been retained by the supplier—generated by using the digital content which is not as such 
provided by the consumer. While the exact scope of data covered under the RtDP is still 
subject to debate, WP29 has made explicit in its guidelines on data portability that inferred 
data and derived data created by the data controller on the basis of data provided by the 
data subject falls outside the reach of the new right.143 As examples of such excluded data, 
WP29 refers to data generated by a personalization or recommendation process and by 
user categorization or profiling.144  
 
Judging from the phrasing of the relevant provisions in the Commission proposal for a 
Digital Content Directive, the data retrieval obligations might instead also apply to this kind 
of derived or inferred data, at least to the extent that this data has been retained by the 
supplier. In the General Approach adopted by the Council in June 2017, however, the 
scope of the data to which the retrieval obligations would apply is limited to “any digital 
content . . . to the extent that it does not constitute personal data, which was uploaded or 
created by the consumer when using the digital content or digital service supplied by the 
supplier.”145 This new formulation put forward by the Council seems to imply that derived 
or inferred data would not be included. It therefore remains to be seen how the legislative 
discussions evolve and what the final scope of the data retrieval obligations will be.146 Their 
scope will determine the extent of protection for users but also the extent of the 
compliance burden for companies as well as the competitive impact of the Digital Content 
Directive on the market.  
 
In this regard, one may wonder whether a consumer has an interest in receiving data that 
is further processed after it has been provided by the consumer or generated through a 
consumer’s use of the digital content. In some cases, such a data retrieval obligation would 
be problematic in terms of its feasibility. Would suppliers, for instance, also be obliged to 
provide consumers with data that is further processed in an anonymized way, where 
re-identification of the consumer places a heavy burden on market players? This could also 
create tensions with the data protection regime, which instead encourages anonymization 
in order to further the fundamental right to data protection.147 Reference can be made 
                                            
143 See discussion supra Section C.II. 
144 WP29, supra note 16, at 10–11. 
145 General Approach of the Council (June 8, 2017), art. 13a(3), 
http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-9901-2017-INIT/en/pdf (emphasis added). 
146 See also Axel Metzger et al., Data-Related Aspects of the Digital Content Directive, 9 JIPITECH 90, 102–04 
(2018) (comparing the RtDP in the GDPR and the data retrieval obligations in the Digital Content Directive). 
147 See Opinion of the European Data Protection Supervisor 4/2017 on the Proposal for a Directive on Certain 
Aspects Concerning Contracts for the Supply of Digital Content 8–9, 18–20, (Mar. 14, 2017), 
https://edps.europa.eu/sites/edp/files/publication/17-03-14_opinion_digital_content_en.pdf (making 
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here to Article 11(1) of the GDPR, as already discussed above, which stipulates that data 
controllers are not required to maintain, acquire or process additional information in order 
to identify the data subject for the sole purpose of complying with the GDPR, including the 
RtDP. The Council tried to solve these issues in its June 2017 General Approach in two 
ways. First, the Council excluded personal data from the scope of the data retrieval 
obligations. Second, the Council stipulated that a supplier is not required to make digital 
content available “to the extent that such digital content created by the consumer only has 
utility within the context of using the digital content or digital service supplied by the 
supplier, or which relates only to the consumer’s activity when using the digital content or 
digital service supplied by the supplier or which has been aggregated with other data by 
the supplier and cannot be disaggregated or only with disproportionate efforts.”148 
 
Apart from its consistency with the GDPR, there is a need to weigh the interests of 
consumers and market players against each other. This is not to say that additional 
portability instruments should not be considered at all. Rather, this is a call for a clear 
goal-oriented approach in developing future regulation to prevent the adoption of new 
legislative or non-legislative measures without adequately examining the potential long-
term effects on the market. With respect to the relationship between different portability 
instruments, several fields of EU law—such as data protection, competition, and consumer 
law—may certainly be applied together and complement each other in enforcing data 
portability. Nevertheless, one should prevent the situation where a wealth of different but 
related portability duties are imposed on market players who may struggle to understand 
what is exactly required under each area of law. There should be consistency between 
different EU initiatives involving some form of data portability.149  
 
This is currently even more important, considering that portability is also emerging in 
legislative proposals targeting portability of non-personal data in a business-to-business 
setting. Article 6(1) of the Regulation on the free flow of non-personal data in the 
European Union establishes the Commission’s role as follows: 
  
                                                                                                                
recommendations to ensure that the Digital Content Directive does not change the balance found by the GDPR 
under which the processing of personal data may take place in the digital market); see also Natali Helberger et al., 
The Perfect Match? A Closer Look at the Relationship Between EU Consumer Law and Data Protection Law, 54 
COMMON MKT. L. REV., 1427–66 (2017) (discussing the relationship between data and consumer protection law 
more generally). 
148 General Approach of the Council, supra note 145, art. 13a(3). 
149 See ETNO Memo, supra note 112, at 9 (explaining—within the context of the GDPR and the EU electronic 
communications framework—that, “[w]hile the data protection oriented data portability right of the GDPR has a 
different scoping and orientation, one should be careful not to impose cumulative, redundant and potentially 
contradictory portability obligations on the telecoms industry.”). 
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[To] encourage and facilitate the development of self-regulatory codes of conduct at Union 
level ('codes of conduct'), in order to contribute to a competitive data economy, based on 
the principles of transparency and interoperability and taking due account of open 
standards, covering inter alia the following aspects: (a) best practices for facilitating the 
switching of service providers and the porting of data in a structured, commonly used and 
machine-readable format including open standard formats where required or requested by 
the service provider receiving the data.150  
 
As such, the applicability of the RtDP under data protection law—and the interpretation of 
its scope in line with its competitive impact—could be a blueprint for the development of 
future general-purpose portability tools under other regimes, including the Digital Content 
Directive and the Regulation on the free flow of non-personal data. 
 
Naturally, there is also a need to align upcoming national implementations of EU legislation 
with new initiatives at the member state level. In this regard, it is worth referring to the 
French Loi pour une République Numérique—adopted on October 7, 2016—which 
introduces a data retrieval obligation for providers of online public communications 
services in French consumer protection law.151 Such disparities—whereby one Member 
State imposes more far-reaching obligations on market players than others—should be 
avoided to prevent 28 different legal regimes concerning data portability from evolving in 
the EU. This will not only increase compliance costs for companies involved in cross-border 
activities but may also distort competition and put the achievement of the EU internal 
market at danger.   
                                            
150 See Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on a framework for the free flow of non-personal 
data in the European Union, art. 6(1) (Nov. 9, 2018), http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/PE-53-2018-
INIT/en/pdf. 
151 See Art. L. 224-42-1 - L. 224-42-4 of Loi 2016-1321 du 7 octobre 2016 pour une République numérique [Law 
2018-132 of October 7, 2016 for a Digital Republic] JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE [J.O.] [Official 
Gazette of France], Oct. 7, 2016, pp. 14–15 (stating that providers of online public communications service have 
to enable a consumer to recover free of charge all data that he or she has stored online—as well as all data 
resulting from the use of his or her user account that can be consulted online—with the exception of the data 
which has been significantly enhanced by the provider concerned). This provision resembles the data retrieval 
obligation that has been included in the proposal for a Digital Content Directive. The difference is that the latter is 
still under consideration in the EU legislative process while the former has already been adopted in its final form. 
As a result, regardless of what will happen to the relevant provisions in the proposal for a Digital Content 
Directive, providers of online public communications services in France have already had to comply with the data 
retrieval obligation set out in French consumer law as of the entry into force of the new duty enters in May 2018 
(simultaneously with the start of the applicability of the GDPR). 
2018 Data Portability and Data Control 1397 
             
Overview Of The Horizontal, Non-Sector-Specific Instruments Currently In Place Or In 
Development Enabling Some Form Of Data Portability* 
 
Data type / 
Entitlement 
Business-to-consumer (B2C) Business-to-business (B2B) 
Pe
rs
on
al
 d
at
a 
General purpose: 
 
(1) GDPR: RtDP (only 
covers personal data 
provided by the data 
subject) 
 
(2) Proposal for a 
Digital Content 
Directive  
(data retrieval 
obligations)** 
Specific purpose: 
 
Competition law 
(exploitation of 
consumers) 
General purpose: 
 
GDPR: RtDP (only 
covers personal data 
provided by the data 
subject – applicable 
in a B2B setting as 
well when a business 
user acts as a 
natural person) 
Specific purpose: 
 
Competition law 
(exclusion of 
competitors) 
N
on
-p
er
so
na
l d
at
a  
General purpose: 
 
Proposal for a Digital 
Content Directive  
(data retrieval 
obligations) 
Specific purpose: 
 
Competition law 
(exploitation of 
consumers) 
 
General purpose: 
 
Regulation on the 
free flow of non-
personal data 
(self-regulatory 
codes of conduct for 
facilitating the 
switching of 
providers) 
Specific purpose: 
 
Competition law 
(exclusion of 
competitors) 
 
 
*Please note that the categorization in B2C and B2B in the table only considers the official 
scope of application of the different instruments. It is important to note, however, that the 
impact of an instrument targeted at enabling data portability in a B2C setting may also 
affect B2B relationships, and the other way around.  
**While the data retrieval obligations in the Commission proposal for a Digital Content 
Directive apply to personal data, the General Approach of the Council excludes personal 
data from their scope. 
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F. Conclusions 
 
This article set out to examine a horizontal, general-purpose regime for data portability as 
a new type of regulatory innovation from the perspective of the control that it confers.  
 
We found that individuals get limited control over their personal data by invoking the RtDP 
under the GDPR. The right will mainly facilitate secondary data reuse among data 
controllers rather than individual data ownership. We contrasted this with upcoming data 
retrieval obligations in the proposal for a Digital Content Directive and the facilitation of 
data portability under competition law. The former is also designed as a general-purpose 
regime. It applies only upon termination of the contract but imposes more property-like 
control. The latter, which is the only one that pre-dates Article 20 of the GDPR, is strictly 
narrower, purpose-specific, offered on case-by-case basis, and does not offer RtDP-alike 
control over data. More conceptually, doubts also remain whether the RtDP fits the 
fundamental right to data protection or represents only a data-related form of regulation 
that aims to stimulate competition and innovation. The question is what the consequences 
of this will be for the implementation of the RtDP in practice. Data protection authorities 
may not feel comfortable with enforcing a right that is not of a traditional data protection 
nature. When asked, the Court of Justice, however, may decide to promote data portability 
as a new concept considering its expansive approach towards data protection in recent 
judgments.  
 
An expansive interpretation of the RtDP will complicate its interface with IP law. There are 
a number of open questions regarding the extent to which companies will be able to 
invoke their IP rights on datasets to preclude data subjects from moving their personal 
data to another provider. As a result, the extent of control the RtDP will bring depends on 
how its balancing with IP law is conducted in practice. While the GDPR is designed as a 
general-purpose control mechanism that applies irrespective of the type of reuse of data, 
the reconciliation of the GDPR with IP rights might again limit the follow-on use of ported 
data by purpose-specific considerations. 
 
The discussion also shows that there is a risk that data portability regimes emerge with 
only loosely defined justifications and thus easily become a goal in and of themselves. 
Moreover, with a growing number of policy interventions, there is a strong need to 
consider the consistency of legal instruments internally and with each other. 
